Senior Defector’s Take on North Korea’s Nuclear Intentions Has Major Implications for US China Policy, and North Korea Too

The U.S. China policy may well be affected as the result of revelations made last week by Thae Yong-ho.  Thae is the most senior North Korean government official to defect to the west in almost twenty years.  In his first interview since his August, 2016 defection, Thae shared insights that will likely have meaningful consequences to the future of the US-China relationship.  Thae’s comments may well impact U.S. China policy under President-elect Trump.

North Korean Defectors Insights Impact U.S. China Policy
North Korean Defector Thae Yong-Ho, Photo: Imgur

Thae indicated that North Korea believes China is fearful of a North Korean collapse.  As a result, China’s ability to pressure North Korea over its nuclear program is limited.  In the event of a North Korean collapse, Thae maintained, China would fear a unified, pro-Western Korea directly on its eastern border.  As Thae put it, “North Korea knows this weakness of China.  As long as Kim Jong Un is in power, North Korea will never give up its nuclear weapons, even if it’s offered $1 trillion or $10 trillion in rewards.”

US China Policy: China Fear of One Korea
Map of China and Korea, flatworldknowledge.com

Thae also stated that Kim would negotiate with the United States only after achieving his nuclear weapon objective.  Kim does not view his nuclear weapon program as a simple bargaining chip with the United States.  Of course, the U.S. goal has been to prevent North Korea from achieving its nuclear weapon objective.

Thae is a life-long diplomat and was North Korea’s number two person in London.  The North Koreans branded him as “human scum”.  Kim stated that “the North sees 2017 as the prime time for nuclear development” given the political changes in South Korea and the United States.

Implications for U.S. China Policy

Thae’s revelations explain the Obama Administration failure to gain China’s full cooperation to reign in North Korea.  The Chinese have apparently been playing a duplicitous game.  They have taken small steps to imply cooperation with the American policy.  At the same time, they have never implemented the steps necessary to compel North Korean to abandon its program.  The U.S. China policy thus becomes more nuanced.

Although China backed tough international sanctions against North Korea during 2016, the critical enforcement of penalties against North Korea remains an ongoing issue.  The United States has long seen China as the key to force the North Koreans to abandon their nuclear program.  Given Thae’s revelations regarding China’s concerns, seen from China’s perspective, a central premise of U.S. policy towards both China and North Korea is subject to full re-examination.

If China’s primary North Korean goal is to ensure the survivability of a North Korean government that remains a friendly ally and an indispensable buffer against the South Koreans, then the United States will face a policy restart in North Korea.  The China-North Korea relationship may be more complex than U.S. officials have believed.  By necessity, this will impact the U.S. China policy.

The North Korea Policy Dilemma Becomes Even More Difficult

The United States has pursued a variety of approaches to North Korea’s nuclear program over the past 24 years.  Under President Obama, the U.S. policy took a definitive turn in 2012 when the North Koreans claimed to be committed to denuclearization and agreed to implement a moratorium on its ballistic missile launches.  Two months later, continuing a long-standing approach whereby they say one thing and do another, the North Koreans violated the agreement.  As a result, President Obama shifted his strategy and focused more heavily on a sanctions-based approach to North Korea.  Obama’s new policy was known as “strategic patience”.  The thrust of the policy was an attempt to bring the North Korean regime to its knees through crippling sanctions.  The policy failed.

Kim Jong Un’s Nuclear and Missile Policies Are Aggressive and Provocative

As pointed out by Van Jackson, an Associate Professor at the U.S. Defense Department’s Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Kim Jong Un has implemented a very aggressive policy:

U.S. China Policy
Van Jackson, North Korea Policy Expert

The last four years under Kim Jong Un have already seen 35 missile launches and three nuclear tests.  In word and deed, Kim Jong Un has laid bare his intentions to mate nuclear warheads to long-range missiles, pursue a hydrogen-based nuclear bomb, and develop a submarine-launched ballistic missile capability, which has long been considered the gold standard of an assured retaliatory capacity.

In Jackson’s view, North Korea has determined to complete its nuclear weapons program:

Gone are the days in which it is possible to speculate that North Korea’s nuclear weapons were mere symbols or bargaining chips, or that the threat of nuclear attack was deeply hypothetical. . .

North Korea’s nuclear program is now more accelerated, less constrained, and more openly linked to its missile program than at any point in its history.  Pyongyang is rushing to deploy a nuclear force that can ensure the regime’s survival . . . But Washington and Seoul are dealing with North Korea is if it were still the 1980s.

U.S. Policy to North Korea Must Adapt to Changed Circumstances

The United States’ goal of a denuclearized North Korea remains perhaps its most difficult foreign policy objective.  Negotiations and sanctions have both failed.

Jackson points out that an American approach that involves (1) making nuclear threats, (2) unifying Korea if war occurs, and (3) constant preparations to deploy large-scale forces to win such a war, “removes incentives for North Korean nuclear restraint in the event of conflict.  By holding to its old ways, the [U.S.-South Korean] alliance is unintentionally making any conflict more likely to go nuclear.”

The Trump Administration will now have to craft a policy that will both reign in North Korea while insuring that China achieves its apparent objective of maintaining a viable and separate North Korea.  With the North Korean nuclear and missile programs proceeding rapidly, developing such a policy will likely be an early and important initiative for Mr. Trump.  Threading this needle will be a significant challenge.  North Korea continues to show no interest in discussing either its nuclear weapons or missile programs.

What might this new policy look like?  Jackson suggests that a new U.S. policy should be based upon two fundamental principles.  First, reduce “the role of nukes in alliance military signaling.”  Second, “planning and curbing the objectives and scope of conflicts that break out.”  Indeed, Jackson believes that American nuclear threats serve no purpose and only incentivizes North Korea to continue its program.

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