The U.S. missile defense system known as THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) will soon be fully deployed in South Korea. The Chinese are upset, and warn of a new arms race. But it’s all their fault. And there’s a very active arm’s race already ongoing. The Chinese have no one to blame but themselves. It was up to the them to pressure North Korea to halt its ballistic missile tests. For months the U.S. made clear that if North Korea persisted, THAAD would be deployed. But the Chinese did nothing. Oh, they suspended coal deliveries, perhaps a signal of invite to the negotiating table. But where the rubber hit the road – suspending missile tests – the Chinese did nothing. They are responsible for the THAAD deployment, pure and simple.
The Chinese gave the Americans an open avenue towards deployment. And frankly, with their ongoing militarization of the South China Sea, in violation of international law, their hands are hardly clean. They complain from an awkward position.
But what does it all really mean? Does the U.S. deployment actually threaten China in any significant way? We think their claimed fears ring largely hollow. We explain.
U.S. Missile Defense System – THAAD’s Capabilities
There are two critical components of THAAD’s capabilities. Intercept and radar.
Intercept Capabilities
THAAD is a defensive system that intercepts incoming missiles of all ranges above the atmosphere. The system can detect targets at a range of 1,000 kilometers. Two THAAD batteries are apparently deployable in a way that would cover the entire of South Korea. If combined with the Patriot missile defense system, THAAD can bring significant missile defensive capability to South Korea.
However, North Korea has an extensive ballistic missile inventory (estimated at approximately 800 in all). A single THAAD battery holds between 48 to 96 ready-to-launch interceptors. Assuming that two interceptors target each incoming missile, it can protect against between 20 to 50 incoming. It takes approximately one hour to reload the THAAD firing canister.
Accordingly, a capability of defending against all North Korean missiles, assuming a full launch, requires a more extensive THAAD deployment. The U.S. will point the THAAD’s radar system north to detect launches. In that configuration, it would be incapable of defending against a North Korean submarine-based launch.
Radar Capabilities
The radar utilized with the THAAD system has two possible configurations. The primary difference in configuration is the radar’s range. The “terminal mode” (TM) configuration is a shorter-range of approximately 600 km. The “forward-based mode” (FBM) permits the relay of tracking and discrimination data to a remote missile defense system (i.e., to systems other than THAAD). The FBM mode would allow the United States to peer more deeply into Chinese territory.
The radar system can be reconfigured to the FBM mode within approximately eight hours. The radar itself is highly mobile and operational within four hours of its deployment.
China’s THAAD Complaints
Two types of concerns match THAAD’s capabilities. Intercept and radar capabilities.
China’s Intercept Concerns
China’s is allegedly concerned about THAAD’s interceptor capabilities. But we give little credence to the legitimacy of that claim. The THAAD system is only capable of destroying short and intermediate range ballistic missiles during their terminal phase. Therefore, it cannot intercept missiles during their boost phase or their mid-course phase. As a result, it cannot intercept missiles launched from the Chinese mainland at the United States. Accordingly, THAAD’s intercept capabilities do not threaten China’s long-range ballistic missile capability, leaving its deterrent capability in tact.
If China perfects its hypersonic gliders capability, THAAD technology will be rendered moot. THAAD is incapable of defending against such gliders, if and when China (and Russia) completes development and deploys.
China’s Radar Concerns
China has a more legitimate concern regarding THAAD’s radar capabilities. The United States indicated that it will deploy THAADs radar system in TM mode. However, as noted a switch-over to FM mode can occur within a matter of hours. In FM mode the radar system can detect missiles from as far away as 2000 km, extending far inside of China. From the Korean peninsula, this would also cover parts of the Russian far east. Some claim that the radar can detect stages the warhead and decoy release stages in China’s missile tests. Further, it may be technologically possible to integrate these THAAD capabilities into the U.S.’s larger missile defense network, potentially compromising some of China’s deterrent capabilities.
In addition, the Chinese fear that Japan, too, will seek a THAAD deployment.
There’s No Real Threat to China From the U.S. Missile Defense System- There is a Growing Threat to the United States
We discount China’s complaints. As a missile interceptor system, the THAAD has some, but limited, utility given China’s strategic focus. China is heavily focused on developing hypersonic gliders and other systems capable of evading the U.S. missile defense capabilities. Accordingly, THAAD as an interceptor threat will soon be fully compromised. Indeed, the U.S. need to significantly advance its missile defense capabilities is never more evident. The U.S. must consider refocusing on a Reagan-like star-wars defense initiative to deal with the numerous, and growing, ballistic missile threats. This is no game for Washington politicians.
